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Abstract
This paper analyzes a random−proposer coalitional bargaining game with different discount
factors, which is a generalized version of Okada's (1996) model. We consider limit subgame
efficiency which means that when the discount factors are sufficiently close to unity, the full
coalition is formed in each subgame. In this paper, a negative result is shown: The limit
subgame efficiency is attained if and only if values of the characteristic function are zero for
all coalitions but the grand coalition. This result implies that under different discount factors,
even under a naturally generalized condition of Okada's necessary and sufficient condition
for the limit subgame efficiency, the limit subgame efficiency is not necessarily achieved. On
the other hand, it is shown that under a condition on the region of players' discount factors,
the generalized condition of Okada's condition is almost necessary and sufficient for the limit
subgame efficiency.
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Okada (1996) introduced a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers,
in which a player is randomly recognized as a proposer in each round. He showed that in equilibrium
of the game, no delay occurs. Also, he provided the equivalent condition for the limit subgame
eﬃciency, which means that when the discount factor is suﬃciently close to unity, the full coalition
is formed in each subgame. The condition is that values of coalitions per capita are monotonic
with respect to sizes of coalitions.
This paper analyzes a generalized game of Okada’s model. In the generalized game, players’
discount factors and recognition probabilities are diﬀerent. Especially, diﬀerence of discount factors
is a key factor of this paper. Under diﬀerent discount factors, even if the equivalent condition for
the limit subgame eﬃciency of Okada (1996) holds, the limit subgame eﬃciency is not necessarily
achieved (Example 1). This is intuitively explained as follows: A proposer may obtain a larger
payoﬀ by proposing subcoalitions with less patient players than the full coalition because by
proposing such coalitions, she does not have to give larger allocations to more patient players,
whose approval seems expensive. Thus, under diﬀerent discount factors, the proposer may have
an incentive to propose subcoalitions. Moreover, however close to 1 each player’s discount factor
is (however small the diﬀerence among players’ discount factors is), the diﬀerence among players’
discount factors matters.
In this paper, we show a negative result: In the generalized Okada model, the limit subgame
eﬃciency is attained if and only if values of the characteristic function are 0 for all coalitions but
the grand coalition. On the other hand, it is shown that under a condition on the region of players’
discount factors, a naturally generalized condition of Okada’s condition above is almost necessary
and suﬃcient for the limit subgame eﬃciency.
This paper is related to Yan (2002), which generalized a variant of Okada model. In the gener-
alized model, recognition probabilities are diﬀerent but discount factors are common. According
to Yan (2002), if the core of the underlying characteristic function form game is not empty, the
limit eﬃciency is attained in a noncooperative game with some recognition probability tuple. The
results of this paper, however, imply that under diﬀerent discount factors, even if the core is not
empty, the limit eﬃciency does not hold for any recognition probability tuple.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 deﬁnes a coalitional bargaining game; Section 3
investigates the eﬃciency.
2. Model
Take a characteristic function form game (N;v). Suppose that N ´ f1;:::;ng for some n 2 N
such that n ¸ 2. Let C ´ 2N n f;g. Suppose that v (fig) = 0 for all i 2 N, v (N) > 0 and
8S;T 2 C : S \ T = ; ) v (S [ T) ¸ v (S) + v (T).
For ± ´ (±k)k2N 2 (0;1)
n, deﬁne a noncooperative bargaining game G(±), which is a generalized
model of Okada (1996) with diﬀerent discount factors and diﬀerent recognition probabilities.
The structure of the game is inductively deﬁned. In the game, there are several states. The set
of states is S ´
©
S 2 2N j v (S) > 0
ª
. At state S 2 S, a player i 2 S is selected as a proposer with
probability pS
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Then, each member in the proposed coalition C other than proposer i announces accepting or
rejecting the proposal according to some predetermined order. If every responder accepts the
proposal, the proposal is enforced and the state goes to state S n C (if v (S n C) = 0, the game
ends). Otherwise, the state remains to be S. The game begins with state N. We say that a
proposal is accepted if every responder accepts it and rejected otherwise.
±i is i’s discount factor. Player i obtains a payoﬀ of ±
t¡1





C 3 i is enforced at the t-th round and nothing otherwise.
In this paper, consider pure strategies. The equilibrium concept employed in the paper is the
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE), which is the subgame perfect equilibrium such
that each player takes the same actions at all rounds with the same state.
We introduce some notations. For n 2 N, ² > 0 and a 2 Rn, let Bn
² (a) be the ²-open ball of a
in the n-dimensional Euclidean space. For any family a ´ (a¸)¸2Λ and ¸ 2 Λ, let pr¸ a ´ a¸. Let
1 be a tuple whose elements are 1.
By the same logic as Okada (1996), there is no delay in G(±) for any ± 2 (0;1)
n.
3. Eﬃciency
In this section, we consider the eﬃciency deﬁned according to Okada (1996).
Deﬁnition 1. Take any ± 2 (0;1)
n. G(±) is a subgame eﬃcient if there exists an SSPE of G(±)




j 8² > 0 : ∆ \ Bn
² (1) 6= ;
ª
.
Deﬁnition 2. Take any ∆ 2 D. G is limit subgame eﬃcient on ∆ if there exists ² > 0 such that
for all ± 2 Bn
² (1) \ ∆, G(±) is subgame eﬃcient.
Deﬁnition 3. G is a limit subgame eﬃcient if G is a limit subgame eﬃcient on (0;1)
n.
Note that the eﬃciency is deﬁned for games in the above whereas it is deﬁned for equilibria in
Okada (1996).
In the case that pS
i = 1
jSj for all S 2 S and all i 2 S, according to Okada (1996), G is














The following example implies that even if the equivalent condition above is satisﬁed, G is
not limit subgame eﬃcient on some ∆ 2 D, which obviously implies that G is not limit subgame
eﬃcient.
Example 1. Suppose that n = 3, pS
i = 1
jSj for all S 2 S and all i 2 S, and v (N) = 1 and
v (fi;jg) = 2
3 for all i;j 2 N i 6= j. Obviously, characteristic function v satisﬁes Okada’s equivalent
condition. Let ∆ ´
©
(±k)k2N 2 (0;1)









6 2 (0;1). Let d ´ ±1. Suppose that G(±) is subgame eﬃcient. Then, there exists an
SSPE of G(±) such that every player proposes the full coalition at any round. For i 2 N, let vi be




(1 ¡ dv2 ¡ d2v3) + 2dv1
3
;
(1 ¡ dv1 ¡ d2v3) + 2dv2
3
;




Thus, v1 = v2 = 1+d
3+2d and v3 = 1
3+2d. At player 1’s proposing node in the ﬁrst round, player 1
obtains a payoﬀ of 1 ¡ d 1+d
3+2d ¡ d2 1
3+2d = 3+d¡2d2
3+2d in the equilibrium. Consider player 1’s deviation
from proposing the grand coalition to proposing coalition f1;3g. By the deviation, player 1 obtains
a payoﬀ of 2
3 ¡ d2 1
3+2d = 6+4d¡3d2
3(3+2d) . Thus, Player 1’s gain from the deviation is equal to ¡3+d+3d2
3(3+2d) ,
which is greater than 0 since d > ¡1+
p
37




Hence, G is not limit subgame eﬃcient on ∆.
Note that there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In the equilibrium, player i 2 f1;2g
stochastically proposes grand coalition N and subcoalition fi;3g at any round with state N.
The ineﬃciency is intuitively explained as follows: By proposing subcoalitions with less patient
players, a proposer does not have to give larger payoﬀs to more patient players, whose approval
is expensive. She may obtain a larger payoﬀ by proposing such subcoalitions than the full coali-
tion. Thus, under diﬀerent discount factors, she may have an incentive to propose subcoalitions.
Moreover, however close to 1 each player’s discount factor is (however small the diﬀerence among
players’ discount factors is), the diﬀerence among players’ discount factors matters.
In the following, we investigate conditions for the eﬃciency under diﬀerent discount factors. To





k2K pk = 1 and any tuple a ´ (ak)k2K 2 RjKj, let Hp (a) and A(a) denote the harmonic






and A(a) ´ 1
jKj
P






















The following lemma provides a condition for G(±) to be subgame eﬃcient given ±.
Lemma 1. Take any ± ´ (±k)k2N 2 (0;1)
n. Then, G(±) is subgame eﬃcient if and only if
HpS (1 ¡ ±S)




















for all S 2 S and T 2 C such that T ½ S, where ±C ´ (±k)k2C for C 2 C.





Proof. See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
Using Lemma 1, we present a equivalent condition for G to be limit subgame eﬃcient. For
± ´ (±k)k2N 2 (0;1)
n, S 2 S and T 2 C such that T ½ S, let L(±;S;T) be the left hand side of
(1).
3Theorem 1. G is limit subgame eﬃcient if and only if v (S) = 0 for all S 2 C n fNg.
Remark. If v (S) = 0 for all S 2 C n fNg, G(±) is essentially the same game as Baron and
Ferejohn’s (1989) model with the unanimity rule.
Proof. See Appendix B. Q.E.D.
According to this theorem, G is limit subgame eﬃcient only under a very strong condition.
The key underlying the theorem is the ﬁrst fraction of the ﬁrst term of the left hand side of (1).
If S 6= T, for any r > 0, for any ² > 0, there exists ± 2 Bn
² (1) \ (0;1)
n such that the fraction
is less than r. This implies that, if there exists S 2 C n fNg such that v (S) > 0, for any ² > 0,
there exists ± 2 Bn
² (1) \ (0;1)






, which means that G is not limit
subgame eﬃcient.
On the other hand, in the following, we show that under a condition on ∆ 2 D, a generalized
version of Okada’s condition is “almost equivalent” to the limit subgame eﬃciency on ∆ of G. For
∆ 2 D, let ∆1 ´ fpr1 ± j ± 2 ∆g. For ∆ 2 D, i 2 N and ±1 2 ∆1, let
f
+




∆;i (±1) ´ inf fpri ± j ± 2 ∆ ^ pr1 ± = ±1g:

















Using these notations, we introduce the following concept:







































n j 8i 2 N n f1g : log±1 + 1 · ±i · e±1¡1ª
is limit-equivalent.
The following theorem states that if ∆ 2 D is limit-equivalent, a generalized version of Okada’s
condition is “almost equivalent” to the limit subgame eﬃciency on ∆ of G.
Theorem 2. Take any ∆ 2 D. Suppose that ∆ is limit-equivalent. Then, (i) G is limit subgame
















for all S 2 S and T 2 C such that T ½ S.
4Proof. See Appendix C. Q.E.D.
If ∆ is limit-equivalent, for any r > 0, there exists ² > 0 such that for all ± 2 Bn
² (1) \ ∆, the
ﬁrst fraction of the ﬁrst term of the left hand side of (1) is in the r-open ball of 1 for all S and T.
From this, the theorem is obtained.
The results of this paper imply importance of similarity of time preferences. Theorems 1 and
2 mean that in general, the eﬃciency of coalitional bargaining is scarcely attained, but if players’
time preferences are similar, the eﬃciency is achieved under a moderate condition.
5Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. (Necessity) Suppose that there exists an SSPE ¾ of G(±) such that every player proposes
the full coalition at any round. Take any S 2 S and any T 2 C such that T ½ S. For i 2 N, let





































(2) and (3) yield
P















±kvk = HpS (1 ¡ ±S)v (S): (4)
From (3) and (4), we have
vi =




i v (S): (5)
By the eﬃciency, v (S) ¡
P
k2Snfig ±kvk ¸ v (T) ¡
P
k2Tnfig ±kvk must hold for i 2 T. Add ±ivi to
both sides of the above inequality. Then, v (S) ¡
P
k2S ±kvk ¸ v (T) ¡
P
k2T ±kvk. Substitute (4)
and (5) into the left hand side and the right hand side of the above inequality, respectively. Then,
















HpS (1 ¡ ±S)v (S) to and from the right hand side of the above
inequality. Then,
















HpS (1 ¡ ±S)v (S):

















HpS (1 ¡ ±S)
HpTjS (1 ¡ ±T)
v (S)
jSj




Obviously, this inequality is equivalent to (1).
6(Suﬃciency) Suppose that (1) holds for all S 2 S and T 2 C such that T ½ S. Consider















with T 3 i if and only if yi ¸ ±ivS




i v (S) for i 2 S. In ¾,
every proposer oﬀers the full coalition at any round. We want to show that ¾ is an SSPE. The













i , which is equal to vS
i by the deﬁnition of vS
i . Thus,
each player’s responding actions of ¾ are unimprovable. At player i’s proposing node at a round
with state S, player i’s gain by one deviation from ¾ to oﬀering proposal to be accepted with


























HpS (1 ¡ ±S)











HpS (1 ¡ ±S)v (S);
which is less than or equal to 0 by (1). At the node, player i’s gain by one deviation from ¾ to








= ¡HpS (1 ¡ ±S)v (S) < 0.
Thus, each player’s proposing actions of ¾ are unimprovable. From the argument above, the One
Deviation Principle implies that ¾ is an SPE. Q.E.D.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. (Necessity) Prove the contraposition. Suppose that there exists S 2 C n fNg such that





1 ¡ x2 if i 2 S
x if i 2 N n S:
Let ± (x) ´ (±k (x))k2N and ±S (x) ´ (±k (x))k2S. Then,
HpN (1 ¡ ± (x))
































1¡x2 = +1 by L’Hˆ opital’s Rule. Then,
lim
x!1
HpN (1 ¡ ± (x))
HpSjN (1 ¡ ±S (x))
= 0:






> 0. Then, there exists ¯ x 2 (0;1) such that

















Obviously, ˆ x 2 (0;1). Take an x¤ 2 (ˆ x;1). Consider ± (x¤). Note that
jj± (x¤) ¡ 1jj =
q
jSj(1 ¡ x2

























. Thus, from Lemma 1, G(± (x¤)) is not
subgame eﬃcient. Hence, G is not limit subgame eﬃcient.
(Suﬃciency) Suppose that v (S) = 0 for all S 2 C n fNg. Then, for any (±k)k2N 2 (0;1)
n, for
any S 2 S = fNg and any T 2 C such that T ½ S, (1) holds. Thus, from Lemma 1, for any
± 2 (0;1)
n, G(±) is subgame eﬃcient. Hence, G is limit subgame eﬃcient. Q.E.D.
C. Proof of Theorem 2

















































HpS (1 ¡ ±S)
v (S)
jSj





























∆;T(±1)) = 1. Thus, for any S 2 S and T 2 C such that T ½ S, for any
r > 0, there exists ² > 0 such that for all ± 2 Bn
² (1) \ ∆,
v (S)
jSj












for some S 2 S and T 2 C such
















jSj ¡½ > 0
8as r of (6). Then, there exists ² > 0 such that for any ± 2 Bn







Thus, there exists ² > 0 such that for any ± 2 Bn






by ½ > 0.
Therefore, there exists ² > 0 such that for any ± 2 Bn
² (1)\∆, G(±) is not subgame eﬃcient. This
implies that G is not limit subgame eﬃcient on ∆.








> 0 as r of (6).
Then, there exists ²(S;T) > 0 such that for any ± 2 Bn







f(S;T) 2 S £ C j S ¾ Tg is ﬁnite, function ² has a minimizer. Let ²¤ be the minimum of ². By
deﬁnition, for all ± 2 Bn







Lemma 1 implies that for all ± 2 Bn
²¤ (1) \ ∆, G(±) is subgame eﬃcient. Therefore, G is limit
subgame eﬃcient on ∆. Q.E.D.
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